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docs: strict_sni_host
options
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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Possible options are:
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protocol {
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allow_h2c
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experimental_http3
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strict_sni_host
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strict_sni_host [on|insecure_off]
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}
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}
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@ -351,7 +351,9 @@ If you wish to _not_ have these headers redacted, you may enable the `log_creden
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- **experimental_http3** enables experimental draft HTTP/3 support. Note that HTTP/3 is not a finished spec and client support is extremely limited. This option will go away in the future. _This option is not subject to compatibility promises._
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- **strict_sni_host** require that a request's `Host` header matches the value of the ServerName sent by the client's TLS ClientHello; often a necessary safeguard when using TLS client authentication.
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- **strict_sni_host** require that a request's `Host` header matches the value of the ServerName sent by the client's TLS ClientHello; often a necessary safeguard when using TLS client authentication. If there's a mismatch, an HTTP status `421 Misdirected Request` response is written to the client.
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This option will be implicitly turned on if [client authentication](/docs/caddyfile/directives/tls#client_auth) is configured. This disallow TLS client auth bypass (domain fronting) which could otherwise be exploited by sending an unprotected SNI value during a TLS handshake, then putting a protected domain in the Host header after establishing connection. This is a safe default, but you may explicitly turn it off with `insecure_off`, for example in the case of running a proxy where domain fronting is desired and access is not restricted based on hostname.
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